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Conservation easements provide a great opportunity for landowners to participate
in environmental conservation.' At a time when solutions to environmental problems
are needed, land management strategies, including conservation easements, 3
continue to play an important role in the country's complex set of environmental
policy efforts. 4 Accordingly, Congress has found it important to provide tax
incentives in the form of charitable deductions to donors of qualifying property
interests so that donors of scenic and natural resources can be amply compensated
for their contributions.5 Conservation easements provide a mechanism by which
private landowners can exchange interests in land for considerable tax deductions
and, for some, a sense that they are contributing to something positive, to a greater
public benefit.6 By conveying an easement to an eligible entity, the landowner is able
to limit what can be done with the land in a way that the landowner and future
generations can be assured that such land will be long protected from development
or wasteful exploitation-7 The effectiveness of conservation land contributions and
the corresponding return on the public's investment can and do vary, however.
8
After a meteoric rise in the popularity of conservation easements in the last
several decades,9 problems with how conservation easements are drafted have begun
to surface, and disputes have resulted accordingly." These disputes are not limited
to academic and theoretical squabbles, though the academic dispute continues to be
2 See John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land Preservation, 3
ENVTL. LAW. 319, 323 (1997) ("The laws enacted during the past forty years to facilitate and encourage
the use of conservation easements are among the most powerful and effective of environmental protection
laws."); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of
Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 283-84 (2006).
3 See Conservation Easements and the National Conservation Easement Database,
NCED: NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE (2017) [hereinafter NCED],
https://conservationeasement.us/storymap/index.html [https://perma.cc/K5YL-ZPDE] (stating
that an estimated 40 million acres of land are currently held under conservation easements); see
also LAND TR. ALL., 2015 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS AT A GLANCE,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrustalliance.org/2015NationalLandTrustCensusReportGlance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X65F-S9SB].
' This very fact is evident just from an account of several government agencies tasked with land
preservation and management, including the National Park Service (NPS), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS), and the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), all govemed in
part by the Wilderness Act of 1964. Robert L. Glicksman, Wilderness Management by the Multiple Use
Agencies: What Makes the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management Different?, 44 ENVTL. L.
447, 448 (2014); see also Charles Wilkinson, Land Use, Science, and Spirituality: The Searchfor a True
and Lasting Relationship with the Land, 21 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1,4 (2000).
1 See S. REP. No. 96-1007, at 9 (1980).
6 See infra Section ll.B.
7 See Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and
Reform, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 755, 755-56.
8 Id. at 756.
9 See NCED, supra note 3 (describing the figure of a line graph as "total acres under conservation
easement in NCED (by year)").
" See W. William Weeks et al., ABA RPTE Conservation Easement Task Force
Report: Recommendations Regarding Conservation Easements and Federal Tax Law, 53 REAL PROP. TR.
& EST. L.J. 245,253 (2018).
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active.1" Conservation easements have begun to face legal challenges,2 requiring
further investment of resources to maintain them, on top of forgone tax revenue and
the opportunity cost of forgone alternative land use.'3 As disputes become more
common, the formal perpetuity requirement in our tax code should be identified as a
source of vulnerability for conservation easements, not as a source of strength. The
perpetuity requirement exists in tension with the common law, and it is unlikely that
the two are readily reconcilable so as to ensure truly perpetual restriction. And in any
case, it is questionable whether requiring conservation easements to be perpetual is
the most effective way to ensure the greatest public and environmental benefit from
charitable conservation donations, at least in light of their significant and rising
public cost.
14
There are several overlapping and interacting reasons for this skepticism. The
first concern arises out of a real possibility of economic and environmental waste.
Conservation easements in perpetuity, whatever their individual merit and
productivity, are not without social and economic costs, and those costs are
embodied in part by wasted environmental and economic opportunities caused by
perpetual restriction. Second, the lack of tailored terms could further diminish or
prevent great conservational opportunities, with standard perpetuity clauses being
either unnecessary or outright inhibitive to the achievement of conservation
objectives. Third, the tax policies that blanketly reward perpetual burdens on land
necessarily aggravate these problems, creating a game of chicken between a rather
artificial prescription for how conservation easements hould be arranged and the
existing common law principles against unreasonable restraints on property.
For these and other omitted reasons,'5 the generous charitable deduction given in
exchange for the grant of a perpetually effective conservation easement amounts to
a positive-sounding incentive program that ultimately rewards inefficient
conservation. 6 It is that inefficiency that itself threatens both the longevity of
conservation easements and the continuing public support for an otherwise effective
conservation method.' 
7
1 See Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of
Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 119, 136 (2010).12 Adena R. Rissman, Conservation Defense and Enforcement in the Land Trust Community, LAND
TR. ALLIANCE (2011), https://www.landtrustalliance.org/news/conservation-defense-and-enforcement-
land-trust-community [https://perma.cc/C53F-PC4A] ("Nearly half of surveyed land trusts (47%, 97 of
205) reported at least one legal challenge or violation of any size or significance. Of these 97 land trusts,
17 prevailed in court at least once and 15 recovered expenses in negotiation out of court.").
13 See id. ("For major legal challenges or violations costing more than $5,000, the average legal or
non-staff cost incurred by land trusts was $37,700. However, one dispute cost more than $400,000, and
two were between $100,000 and $300,000. Overall, the 205 land trusts reported 43 major challenges and
violations, costing those organizations a total of $1.6 million.").
14 See Colinvaux, supra note 7, at 756; Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Cost of a Surprising Tax Shelter:
The Syndicated Conservation Easement, BROOKINGs INsT. (Dec. 20, 2017), https_/www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2017/12/20/estirnaing-the-rising-cost-of-a-surprising-tax-shelter-the-syndicated-conservatibon-easement/
[https'J/permaec/Y6XB-PNF7] (noting that the deductions for conservation easements rose "from $971 million in
2012 to $1.1 billion in 2013 to $3.2 billion in 2014").
i This is a robust topic of discussion, so this Note must narrow its criticisms to a few grounds.
16 GianCarlo Canaparo, The Lesser of Two Inefficiencies: An Anticommons Alternative to Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 102 GEO. L.J. 219, 228-29 (2013).
17 See Bray, supra note 11, at 137 38.
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In this Note, I focus on one of the several common issues with conservation
easement implementation. With regard to conservation easements, I argue that the
inclusion of perpetuity clauses inherently offends the common law and that they
subvert public expectations of how economic and social costs are justified by
environmental preservation.8 To disregard longstanding common law doctrine by
mandating perpetuity for tax-benefit eligibility is, in effect, perhaps
counterintuitively, to compromise the longevity of the conservation easement itself,
while allowing many taxpayers and policymakers to kick the can down to road.'9
The common law doctrines that long precede even the earliest conservation
easements protect valuable economic and moral policies of property ownership and
will be applied where necessary to meet future generations' needs."0 The true social
and economic costs of these easements will become apparent, especially as they
become increasingly vulnerable to challenge.2 It is predicted that litigants will soon
have to mend the flaws of yesterday's transactions, perhaps resulting in the reduction
or transformation of America's conservation easements.
22
Contributing further to the problem is the artificial insulation of conservation
easements from general common law prohibitions regarding heavy restraints on land
use. 23 This arbitrary exception to common law principles will not survive later
challenges from both public and private parties, and the exception to the rule will
ultimately bend under the pressures of changing social values.24 Regardless of how
valuable a restriction on property use might be argued, the duration of a restraint on
property is a factor in considering its reasonableness and usefulness, and, as will be
's See infra Part III.
'9 See discussion infra Section II.E; see generally Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land
and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 744 (2002) (warning of the possibility that
conservation easements "impose significant potential costs on future generations by deliberately making
non-development decisions hard to change").2
1 See Jeffrey M. Tapick, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conservation Easements, 27 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 257, 296 (2002).
21 See Rissman, supra note 12.
22 See Mahoney, supra note 19, at 744; see also Rissman, supra note 12.
23 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. i (2000) ("The social utility of
devoting property to conservation, historic preservation, and charitable purposes is strong enough to
justify severe restraints on alienation that are reasonably necessary or convenient to assure that the
property will be used to carry out the intended purposes."). It may be true that conservation easements
can provide significant social utility. But even the Restatement goes on to say that the reasonableness of
these restraints is only justifiable insofar as the restraints are connected to the purported social purpose.
Id. This connection must necessarily be made by virtue of tailored, purposeful terms, not uniform ones.
24 Compare id. § 3.4, 3.4 cmt. c. ("A servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of the
burdened estate is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable.... Determining reasonableness of a restraint on
alienation requires balancing the utility of the purpose served by the restraint against the harm that is likely
to flow from its enforcement.... The harmful effects that may flow from restraints on alienation include
impediments to the operation of a free market in land, limiting the prospects for improvement,
development, and redevelopment of land, and limiting the mobility of landowners and would-be
purchasers."), with UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM 'N 1981) (proclaiming
the general validity of a conservation easement even if"it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
... it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law; ... it imposes a negative
burden; . .. it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or
upon the holder; ... the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or [] there is no privity of estate
or of contract").
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discussed, the infinite duration is a condition that courts tend to find unreasonable
and overly restrictive.25 Perpetual restrictions on property have long been considered
offensive, wastefil, and economically untenable, with few exceptions made for their
effectiveness.26 Two of those exceptions are the exception for charitable trusts and
the donation of conservation easements in gross.
27
This Note points out he inconsistency between the policy values of our common
law property doctrine and the blanket requirement of perpetuity in conservational
transfers. Whenever a restriction on property is challenged in a court of competent
jurisdiction, the court is more likely to strike down the restriction the weaker the
connection is between the weight of the restriction and the restriction's purported
purpose.28 This Note is by no means intended to argue that the common law should
be used to challenge those easements that are productive. Quite the contrary. Rather,
it is meant to insist that the common law will be used to strike down excessive
restrictions given the right circumstances no matter how important our society
currently regards the restriction.29 Perhaps counterintuitively, it is evident that a
perpetuity clause may work to shorten the life of a conservation easement, making it
worthwhile to seek alternatives to perpetuity so that practitioners can better craft
conservation easements for longevity and effectiveness."
Conservation easements are still relatively novel.3 Though they are supported
by popular policy objectives often pertaining to environmental conservation, they are
not as exceptional in their legal character as they have been regarded under federal
and state law, particularly our federal tax code. Because sound environmental policy
is apparently more important than ever, and because conservation easements have
the potential to play an important and effective role in the furtherance of
environmental causes, I provide an evaluation and case study of the rehabilitation of
native Kentucky wildlife as a model for active conservation projects.2 The purpose
of the case study is to provide an exceptional example of success in conservation,
partially supported by conservation servitudes, and how it embodies the conscious,
25 See infra Section IlIl.A; see also 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 91
(2019) ("The factors tending to support the conclusion that a restraint on alienation is unreasonable
are: ... (4) the restraint is unlimited in duration .... ).
2' The most notable for our purposes are the exceptions made for charitable contributions like
charitable trust donations and conservation easements. See infra Section II.C.27See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. i (2000).
28 See Tapick, supra note 20, at 278-81.
29 See infra Part I1. Some statutes already expressly authorize and anticipate such actions, permitting
them in accordance with existing principles of law and equity. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-409
(West 2019); KY. REV. STAT. § 382.820 (West 2020) ("(1) An action affecting a conservation easement
may be brought by: (a) An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement; (b) A holder
of the easement; (c) A person having a third-party right of enforcement; or (d) A person authorized by
other law. (2) KRS 382.810 to 382.860 shall not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a
conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§ 49.4 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1013 (West 2019); see also UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT
ACT § 3 (UNLF. LAW COMM'N 1981). All of these state statutes in the same provisions that establish
conservation easement validity provide for remedies against them, conferring standing to different classes
of parties.
o See Weeks et al., supra note 10, at 255.
31 Id. at 252.
32 See infra Section III.C.
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active efforts that would justify an existing conservation easement for as long as its
meaningful life despite embodying a severe restriction on use and alienation.
If it is unclear by now, and it is understandable if that is the case, this Note is
fundamentally about competing human values, about social policy borne out of
varying and changing social priorities. More specifically, it is about the American
courts' recognition of this competition between values and what the courts consider
when circumstances require that one value give way to another. Further, the
successful practitioner must be expected to account for such considerations when
their work product is meant to operate over a long period of time. Thus, those drafting
conservation easements must consider why and how their instrument can be
challenged, and how the terms of the easement can be strengthened to endure
challenge so that the client's and public's expectations regarding the instrument will
be realized.33
Part I of this Note describes the nature and rise in popularity of conservation
easements as a legal mechanism. Part II describes the common law doctrines that
concern restrictions on the alienation and use of property, the policy reasons
justifying their existence, and how courts review perpetuity clauses and other terms
of restriction under their multi-factor considerations. Part III will tie the concepts
together, suggesting a solution to the vulnerability of perpetuity clauses in the form
of more tailored terms for conservation efforts and offering a positive model through
a Kentucky conservation project that benefited from the use of land trusts and
conservation lands. In this last Part, alternatives to uniform term requirements will
be suggested so that our environment can be preserved and rehabilitated more
effectively and land can be put to a more optimal public use in ways that do not so
blatantly conflict with common law doctrines or compromise the longevity of
conservation servitudes. The more conservation easements comport with established
common law doctrine, the more evident their actual and continuing benefits will
become and, therefore, the more resilient they will be in the face of future legal
challenge. The common law is quietly exerting pressure upon modem conservation
easements in a way that effective practitioners and policymakers alike should be
aware of.
I. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: THEIR NATURE AND HISTORY
34
A conservation easement is, generally speaking, "[a] nonpossessory
interest... in real property" that imposes "limitations or affirmative obligations,"
the purposes of which most often include the protection of the "natural, scenic, or
open-space values of real property."35 The transferors of these interests officially
purport conservational motivations through the instruments they execute-usually
for deduction eligibility-and such eligibility hinges on the donation being made
"' See Tapick, supra note 20, at 296.
34 For a wonderful, thorough, and well-supported exposition of this history, see generally Bray, supra note 11.
3 Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation
Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (1996) (quoting
UNW. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § l(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1981)).
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exclusively for a conservational purpose.36 The terms of these arrangements often
condition the transfer on certain requirements for the use and management of the
property in light of qualifying conservational objectives,37 such as strong restrictions,
sometimes absolute, on development and use of the land. These transfers can be
made inter vivos between living parties, passed as part of one's estate in fee, or in
trust to an entity, such as a private trustee or state government asked with managing
and protecting the transferred property according to the grant's terms.38 The most
common legal apparatus for the management and protection of lands under
conservation easements is the private land trust,39 although states and localities
assume this role to a lesser but significant extent.4 ° In general, these encumbrances
impose perpetual limitations in the terms of the transfer as a condition of tax
deduction eligibility, although the transfer instruments can be drafted without
perpetuity clauses if the transferor is willing to forego the charitable deduction under
Section 170(h).4 It is this perpetual term that is the focus of the inquiry of this Note.
The means and purposes of establishing conservation easements is by now
well-established, although changing.42 For the transferor of conservation land, the
transfer of land in fee or partial interest in the form of the servitude to a qualifying
government or land trust confers remarkable tax benefits to the land owner.4 3 Simply
put, the charitable-donation deduction is available to donors of a qualified real
property interest when they transfer a sufficient interest in land to a qualifying
organization exclusively for certain conservational purposes." The sharp historical
rise in popularity of conservation easements is due in large part to the tax incentives
available to transferors, first experimented with by individual states and then
eventually added to the United States Tax Code.45
36 Belk v. Comm'r, 140 T.C. 1, 7 (2013), affid, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) ("For a contribution to
constitute a qualified conservation contribution, the taxpayer must show that the contribution is (1) of a
'qualified real property interest' (2) to a 'qualified organization' (3) 'exclusively for conservation
purposes."' (emphasis added) (citing I.R.C. § 170(h)(1))).
31 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1)-(5) (2018), for both a definition of and examples of qualifying
"conservation purposes."
38 See generally Weeks et al., supra note 10.
39 See Bray, supra note 11, at 129-30 ("By 1996, private land trusts were recognized, in the words of
a former director of the Sierra Club, as 'the strongest arm of the conservation movement."' (citing
RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 11 (2003))).
40 See id. at 128-29.
41 Taxpayers are permitted to reduce their income tax liability by deducting the value of contributions
to certain organizations, including charities, federal, state, local, and Indian tribal governments, and other
qualifying organizations. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND
RELATING TO THE FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, JCX-4-13, at 1 (2013).
The general requirements for receiving a deduction, qualified by more specific provisions like Section
170(h) of the tax code, are (1) the recipient of the contribution must qualify under Section 170, (2) "the
transfer must be made with gratuitous intent," and (3) the transfer must be a complete and irrevocable
transfer of the donor's entire interest, among other equirements depending on what is donated. Id. at 6.
42 See Carpenter v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001, *2-3 (2012) (discussing how the IRS
determines deductibility qualifications regarding a conservation easement arrangement).
43 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2018) (stating the extent to which a federal tax deduction is allowed
for qualified conservation contributions).
4Id. § 170(h).4
1 See Bray, supra note 11, at 126-33.
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Under the common law, conservation easements are still somewhat novel, and
their implementation is still being refined and changed as time passes.4' Some
sources trace the origin of the conservation easements as a legal mechanism to
Massachusetts in 1891."7 Especially early on, conservation easements were not
widely used, and their legitimacy was in serious question under the common law.48
States gradually adopted enabling acts, such as the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act ("UCEA"), to validate and legitimize conservation easements.49 The Tax Code,
in Section 170(f)(3)(B), provided deductions for transfers of the land for
conservational purposes to federal, state, and local governments for the first time in
1976,50 in the wake of the 1960s environmental movement.5 By 1980, just a year
before the UCEA was drafted, 2 the federal government expanded deduction
eligibility to transfers of land to private land trusts, not just public organizations, so
long as the easement was made for qualified environmental purposes and made in
perpetuity.5 3 A deduction on one's estate tax was subsequently made available for
land transferred at death to a qualifying public entity or private land trust.54 It was in
the 1980s, when tax deduction eligibility was expanded, that the use of conservation
easements most suddenly proliferated.55 Americans soon began to realize the tax
benefits of such transfers, and the conservation easement saw a remarkable increase
in use and public support, coaxed further by the expansion of the categories of
transfers eligible for the tax deduction.56
There was one significant requirement upon which the deduction, particularly
under the federal tax code, was conditioned: perpetuity. 57 This means that the
conservation easement must, at least on the face of the transfer agreement, be made
" Weeks et al., supra note 10, at 252-53.
47 E.g., BREWER, supra note 39, at 13; Bray, supra note 11, at 126.
" Bray, supra note 11, at 127 ("Without specific state statutory authorization, conservation easements
existed in a state of 'dubious legality' because some of their central characteristics were disfavored at
common law: first, conservation easements are 'negative' easements that tend to prevent rather than to
grant land uses in perpetuity; and second, conservation easements are easements in gross." (footnote
omitted) (quoting Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
VA. L. REv. 739, 749 (2002))).
4' See K. King Burnett, The Uniform Conservation Easement Act: Reflections of a Member of the
Drafting Committee, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 773, 775 (explaining that the UCEA was model legislation
intended to be adopted by state legislatures to enable the creation of conservation and historical
preservation easements). By 1998, forty-seven states had adopted some form of easement-enabling
statutes, such as the UCEA. Bray, supra note 11, at 129 n.47.
50 Bray, supra note 11, at 131, 131 n.62.
51 BREWER, supra note 39, at 40 ("From 1965 to 1975, growth rate was around 9 percent per year.
This corresponds with the blossoming of the public environmental movement.").
52 Bray, supra note 11, at 128.
5 ld. at 131.54 Id. at 132.
'- See id. at 129, 132 ("[The growth rate was at its highest, about 16%, from 1985-1988-a period
coincident with the early expansion of the federal tax deduction." (citing BREWER, supra note 39, at 40)).
56 See generally id. at 130-36 (explaining how the federal tax deduction for easement donations gave
rise to conservation easements and private land trusts).
57 I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2018).
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effective forever.58 For example, if an agreement forbids removal or exploitation of
the flora, fauna, or mineral resources from a particular parcel, that restriction carries
on, running with the land forever, effective against everyone as a restriction held in
gross.59 While the terms of these servitudes might be negotiated and dickered to an
extent, perpetuity clauses must be included for tax deduction eligibility, regardless
of the dynamic environmental and social needs of future generations as they relate
to a particular parcel of donated land.
As the reader may already correctly suspect, the connection between a perpetuity
requirement and the purported conservational purpose is not obvious. Federal tax
policy has assumed its necessity from the start; otherwise, it wouldn't require it as
an element of deduction qualification. 6 0 The federal government thus foregoes
remarkable tax revenue under the assumption that perpetuity is an important feature
of effective environmental conservation.61 While the empirical studies on the costs
and benefits of conservation easements are still relatively young and developing, it
is very easy to surmise that a uniform perpetuity requirement for deduction eligibility
is inherently incapable of serving the purpose it purports and is in fact not genuinely
or thoughtfully designed to do so. Ecological and environmental changes in a given
country, state, or ecosystem occur all the time and at different rates.62 Accordingly,
so do the methods and terms needed to allow conservation easements to work
effectively within their surrounding ecological context. These changes are so various
and even unpredictable that such uniform tax requirements cannot possibly
incentivize optimal management of protected lands in a way that meets their official
conservational purpose.63 It is this assumption that uniform perpetual restriction is
necessary, and thus must be required for deduction eligibility, that this Note
investigates.
Real world examples demonstrate how successful environmental management
requires thoughtful and tailored approaches, not a uniform approach and
implementation. The way that California manages its tinderbox forests with
controlled-bum fires is going to look very different from the way in which Maine
will conserve its lush forests and streams. The demand for public access to remote
portions of the Mojave Desert is going to be very different (presumably much more
limited) than a beach-front reservation on the Florida coast. The needs of each
ecosystem require more serious reflection, particularly because of the unlimited
differences in how states and land trusts could possibly engage in the responsible
" See Bray, supra note 11, at 136 (citing "the potential inefficiencies conservation easements may
present to future decision makers as a result of the facial pretense of perpetuity required by the federal
deduction" as among the major criticisms and bases for reform in regard to conservation easements).
'9 See I.R.C. § 170(hX5) (2018).
60 See Bray, supra note 11, at 131.
61 Id. at 147 ("Conservation easements, in other words, are not cheap, and the foregone government
revenue attributable to fraudulent conservation easement donations might well be a huge amount of
money, even if it is only a small percentage of the total amount of foregone revenue attributable to all
conservation easement donations.").
62 See Federico Cheever, Property Rights and the Maintenance of Wildlife Habitat: The Case for
Conservation Land Transactions, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 431, 432 35 (2002).
61 Cf id at 431 (arguing that "the inherent qualities of the legal institutions... [of] property make that type of
institution more suitable for the maintenance of wildlife habitat than the legal institutions... [of] regulation").
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management of conservation lands. In doing so, we will necessarily reflect on how
perpetual encumbrances actually serve the ecosystems on such lands and how much
of a returned benefit to the public actually accrues by their use. 64 Because
conservation easements are "negative" servitudes, meaning they prevent certain uses
and transfers of the affected parcel,65 the duration of a conservation easement's effect
is an important component of its implementation, as is implied by the tax code's
perpetuity requirement.
Conservation easements in perpetuity are essentially bought at the expense of the
public, not just through the charitable tax deduction, but also the opportunity cost of
alternative uses for donated land.66 The tax code's requirement hus incentivizes the
very sorts of relatively excessive burdens on property use, management, and transfer
that individuals are otherwise prevented from placing on property through their own
private transfers under common law doctrine and related public policy. It is by no
means my intention to question the need for conservational efforts generally, much
less the promising role that conservation easements can or could play in the grand
scheme of environmental protection. But it is important that we measure the desired
benefits of perpetual burdens so that standardization of easement erms can be more
rationally connected to their purported conservational end. As this inquiry unfolds,
it should become evident that common law doctrines opposed to perpetual burdens
on property will be used to strike down or limit conservation servitudes in the not
too distant future.
I. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY TREATMENT OF RESTRICTIONS
ON ALIENATION AND PERPETUAL INTERESTS
Since the introduction, this Note has alluded to common law doctrine. American
common law has descended in part from its English predecessor.67 Significantly,
these doctrines arose and have since endured in large part because they promote
enduring social values and in part because of America's traditional reverence for the
common law it adopted.6" The English common law developed doctrines that limited
64 See infra Part III.
6 1 JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 2:10 (2019)
("[A] negative easement enables the holder to prevent the owner of the servient estate from doing things
the owner would otherwise be entitled to do. A negative easement does not permit the holder to enter or
use the servient estate; it limits the right of the servient owner to utilize the servient owner's own land."
(footnotes omitted)). As a matter of technical distinction, negative easements are not to be confused with
restrictive servitudes. Id. at n.14.6 6 See Bray, supra note 11, at 145-48.
67 Randy j. Holland, Anglo-Amffican Templars: Common Law Crusaders, 8 DEL. L. REv. 137, 138 (2006)
("[H]istory reflects that the common denominator of the Anglo-American legal system is the English common law.
The fundamental principles found in the Magna Carta, 1628 Petition of Right, 1689 English Bill of Rights, United
States' Bill of Rights, and the rights set foih in our respective written and unwritten constitutions all have common
law origins." (footnotes omitted) (first citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 8 (1971); and then citing A.E. DicK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITT[ONAISM IN AMERICA (1968))).
68 See id. at 148 ("In his speech on conciliation with America in 1775, Edmund Burke noted 'that in no country
in the world was law so generally studied' In making that assertion, he referred to the fact that as many copies of
Blackstone's Commentaries had been sold in America as in England." (footnote omitted)).
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how property owners exercised their freedom of disposition, focusing primarily on
actions that would have decreased the alienability of property.69 These doctrines
addressed the social harm caused by effectively removing property from commerce
and placing restrictions on the efficient use of property. Significantly, these common
law doctrines have been around longer than the earliest conservation easements.7"
The reader should notice a common thread of underlying social policy that embodies
a skeptical tilt against restrictions on real property, especially those held in gross or
held by no ascertainable party.7 The inference should be further drawn that, despite
special treatment of conservation easements for policy reasons, conservation
easements cannot remain permanently insulated to future social and economic
pressures.72 Since the common law endures in part to uphold long-acknowledged
human values, the arbitrary elevation of environmental conservation will only work
to the detriment of land-based conservation efforts, including conservation
easements, precisely because that elevation works to compete with other social
values that remain to exert pressure upon artificially prioritized human endeavors.
This Part seeks to clarify why this is the case and to explain more deeply why
perpetual conservation easements are vulnerable precisely because of their
perpetuity.
A. Colonial History and the Inheritance of the English Common Law
Several common law doctrines have developed in American property law
jurisprudence, inherited in part from our English common law predecessors, and
have ultimately been tailored to meet the policy values of American states. 73 In
contrast to the English tradition, the law in the States has historically placed more
value on a donor's freedom of disposition and considerations of the circumstantial
benefits of arrangements of property ownership.74 Compared to American law, the
original English doctrines placed limitations on an individual's freedom of
disposition, at least in part out of concern for the relative scarcity of real property in
England and the threat of mass concentrations of inalienable wealth amongst the few
landed gentry.75 The American experience has been historically less concerned with
these issues because the American territory had such immense expanses of surplus
69 See David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared
History-Part 11: How Anglo-American Land Law Diverged After American Colonization and
Independence, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 295, 298-300 (1999); see generally George L. Haskins,
Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977) (providing a historical account of the Rule Against Perpetuities).
71 See Thomas, supra note 69, at 297, 299.
71 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What Have We
Learned and Where Should We Gofrom Here?, 33 UTAH ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2013).
72 See Rissman, supra note 12.
73 See generally Thomas, supra note 69, at 324-54 (providing an individualized state by state
discussion of the American adoption of English common law).
74 See id. at 297 98.
71 See id. at 298-300 ("Through the centuries, the tension between landowners seeking to preserve
their family dynastic landholdings and landowners wishing to increase alienability and boost their
property values has shaped English property interests.").
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land and because enterprise and property ownership has long been promoted and
encouraged in American culture.
7 6
The colonies and later-formed states frequently adopted the English common
law, often expressly by statute.77 Yet, the English common law was usually adopted
only insofar as it comported with existing natural and physical conditions in the New
World, and only to the extent the common law could exist in harmony with the
United States Constitution and the statutory law duly passed by the legislatures of a
given territory.78 In particular regards to property ownership and transfer, there were
marked differences in the common law as it developed in the states because the
aforementioned conditions of property ownership in England were very different.79
What is demonstrated in the careful adoption of the English common law is an
emphasis on the existing physical and natural conditions of a young United States,
rather than a disregard for the needs and values of the American people who lived in
different circumstances than England.
While the adoption and evolution of the common law in the states resulted in
altered permutations of the English doctrines and variation among the states, the
underlying policies of the adopted doctrines were still shaped by similar policy
concerns as in England, policy concerns discussed below.8 0 These policy concerns
have lead American courts to account for the resulting economic, social, and political
costs, such as waste,81 social inequity,82 and resulting constitutional issues caused by
excessive or inequitable restraints placed on property.3 This Part briefly discusses a
few of the inherited policies underlying some such common law doctrines,
emphasizing from the start that exceptions to such doctrines have been arbitrarily
made conservation easements, as if these easements were any other charitable
transfer of property. The discussion to follow in Part III will elaborate on why these
relatively young doctrinal exceptions made for conservation easements may be
misguided, even naive, at least in light of the standard inclusion of perpetuity clauses
common to these servitudes. The natural conclusion should be that rather than
carving out unnatural exceptions for arguably unexceptional property transfers,
transferors and governments should seek to establish actual exceptionality as to
particular conservation easements, because the common law favors-and, indeed,
frequently requires-that a restriction be proportional and connected in some way to
the restriction placed on property.
76 See id. at 298, 324-25 ("The American colonials were stubborn, cocky, independent minded, and
they had almost unlimited available land. Not surprisingly, they began shaping a land law that took into
account the new environment and that diverged from the more gradual changes occurring in England.").
77 Id. at 325-54.
78 E.g., Kroeger v. Twin Buttes R.R., 114 P. 553, 554 (Ariz. 1911) ("The [English] common law, so
far only as it is consistent with, and adapted to the natural and physical condition of this territory, and the
necessities of the people thereof, and not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the Constitution of the United
States, or Bill of Rights, or laws of this territory... is hereby adopted and shall be the rule of decision in
all courts of this territory.").
7 See id. at 554-55; Thomas, supra note 69, at 298-300.
o See infra Section II.B.
Si See, e.g., Rogers v. At., G. & P. Co., 107 N.E. 661, 661 (N.Y. 1915) (defining permissive waste).
82 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1948) (demonstrating the social inequity of
common law principles when the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated by racism).
" See generally id., for an example of a socially unacceptable restraint on property.
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B. The Common Law and its Underlying Principles
At the core of the American common law tradition is a complex set of evolved
social values, sifted through and screened by human experience. It is particularly the
American experience that has worked to refine much of the property law we know
in the United States.84 The product of this historical process is not merely black letter
law, but, more significantly, a logic that endures through time and changing
circumstances.85 In large part, the ingenuity of the common law system is owed to
the decentralized balance it strikes between the durability of its precedent on the one
hand, essentially its reluctance to abandon past assumptions about the world and
about society, and its careful adaptability to new circumstances on the other.86 What
the states inherited from the English is more than just a civil system of judicial
governance. The common law system is the product of a legal and social
philosophy,87 one that is based on an assumption that there exists discoverable
principles and truths, which, once discovered, should guide future generations as
applicable under varying and changing circumstances.88 But none of these truths are
absolute, and no principle among them is so uncompromising that public policy fails
to reflect the course of human progress and shifting social priorities. Legal principles
endure through common law precedent, to some extent removed from the more
fashionable and ultimately temporary public policy de jure. 89 Despite changing
policy contexts, the principles underlying the common law do not disappear so
s See supra Section II.A.
8 At the risk of clich6, this sentiment, though put differently, was articulated well by a personal hero
and, perhaps, the greatest personality to ever grace the Supreme Court of the United States, Oliver Wendell
Holmes: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923). While Holmes says it is not "logic," I believe that he meant "logic"'in a
certain sense, that the common law is not entirely rational in the Enlightenment sense. But I might say,
though the origins were far from logic in this Enlightenment sense, the collective experience that brought
forth the common law over the centuries does have a social logic as it were, one that addresses problems
in the most sophisticated and enduring way yet known.
86 Indeed, this balance is most needed here, considering the competing interests that conservation
easements present. See Weeks, supra note 10, at 253 ("A conservation easements binds together th ee
parties with potentially conflicting interests: (1) the owner of the encumbered land (who may or may not
be the original easement donor), (2) the non-profit or governmental holder of the easement, and (3) the
public, which invested in and is beneficiary of the easement's conservation protections.").
87 
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Bar as a Profession, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 153, 156
(1920) ("[O]ur law has reached broader and more profound generalizations than the Roman law, and at
the same time far surpasses it in the detail with which it has been worked out.").
88 Justice Cardozo and Sir Frederick Pollock have even used the phrase "Our Lady of the Common
Law." John C. H. Wu, The Natural Law and Our Common Law, 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 13 (1953)
("I shall start from the full-blooded experience of the Common Law. We may mount higher and higher
until we attain a transcendental vision of the Natural Law or even of the Eternal Law. But our starting
point must be a juridical experience." (emphasis added)). Wouldn't it be nice if law review articles were
still written like this?
89 See Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States ofAmerica, 54 AM. J.
COMp. L. 67, 72-74 (2006). Of course, that may be equity's proper role: to offer individualized exceptions
to the common law where the common law's application is a clear affront under that slippery notion of
"judicial conscience" and "decency." See CASES CONCERNING EQUITY AND THE COURTS OF EQUITY
1550-1660 xxx (William Hamilton Bryson ed., 2001) ("A grossly unfair and harsh bargain that 'shocks
the conscience' will be set aside by principles of equity even though the common law rules of making the
contract were followed.").
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readily, even under statutory direction. The common law remains relevant, and it
would be extremely unwise to fail to consider it without the thought that is due to
it.90 As new priorities emerge under new circumstances, such as environmental
protection in light of global climate change, it is our duty, as heirs of the common
law, to figure out how the greatest harmony can be struck between these new
priorities and long-held principles under the common law. It is therefore crucial to
understand what the common law tells us and why we still apply it today.
Deriving from and embodying the common law, American property law grants
individual property owners exceptionally broad freedom to control the use and
disposition of their property.9 ' This freedom of disposition is grounded in a deep,
culturally embedded respect for the sovereignty of the individual over the fruit of his
life and labor. 92 The individual's lawful dominion over his property therefore
occupies a persistently elevated level of regard in American property law. As a result,
we protect the individual's right to alienate, use, invest, and otherwise dispose of
their property as they see fit, although within certain limitations, and generally with
lesser regard to popularly, democratically determined ideas about how one ought to
dispose of their property in relation to others in society.93
A second principle of American property law, which is characteristically strong
in the English common law ancestry, is the idea that property, as well as other forms
of wealth, should not sit idle and unproductive.94 In other words, property ownership
should not be so within the owner's domain that it accrues to the disproportionate
detriment of society or other social units. Thus, even strong protection for individual
ownership is not truly paramount but is, in fact, subject to limitations based on this
general limiting principle. One could argue that this principle has broader, perhaps
deeper application through the common law judicial governance of property
ownership because, after all, arguments can be made for individual investment and
90 After all, basic rules of statutory construction seek to reconcile statutes with the common law. See. e.g.,
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) ("[Wjhere a common-law principle is well
established, as are the rules of preclusion, the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an
expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."' (citations
omitted)); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the common law or the
general maritime law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident").
9' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2003) ("The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition.
Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please."); 70 C.J.S.
Perpetuities § 12 (2019) (stating that certain common law rules share similar purposes in that they "are
aimed against the withdrawal of property from commerce").
92 See JOHN LOCKE, The Labor Theory of Property, in RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 195,
196 (1923) (explaining the labor theory in which every man has the right to "the work of his hands"); D.
Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36, 44, 47-48 (2009) (discussing the
zones of autonomy with respect to one's property and freedom over that property).
93 
Se, e.g., Matteson v. Walsh, 947 N.E.2d 44, 46-47 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (reviewing waste of property);
see also Zauner v. Brewer, 596 A2d 388, 393-4 (Conn. 1991) (discussing permissive waste as it applies to a
plaintiff's allegation that defendant committed waste because the defendant neglected the property).94 See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation,
91 CORNELL L. REv. 653, 658-59, 690 (2006) (discussing the emphasis on property to be productive and
maximize the self-interest of the owner).
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property ownership on the basis of efficiency and maximal social benefit.95 But
significantly and necessarily, the principle of efficient use of property finds itself
manifested in common law rules that limit the individual's sovereignty over their
property. These limitations count for a large part of this Note's discussion of
common law rules because only by understanding the rule's underlying rationale can
a reasonable prediction be made that conservation easements are compromised by
the very thing that was supposed to strengthen them: their facial perpetuity.
Finally, a third principle, or another human value if you prefer, enters
consideration to limit and to be limited by the other two principles. Environmental
consciousness now enjoys growing priority in American law, with land use and
preservation playing a key role in the preservation and rehabilitation of the
environment.96 But the need for environmental protection, like the other two values,
is not without its own costs. Those costs include the limitation of a property owner
to do what he wishes with his land,97 as well as the prospect of inefficiency and
waste. 98 Interestingly, though, conservation easements are not exclusively of
common law origin. Rather, they are largely creatures of statute. 99 Limits on
development, exploitation, and use of land are common in laws that promote
environmental protection,00 and the recognition of the conservation easement under
the federal tax code is just one more example of the statutory origin of much
environmental law.'0" How environmental law and policy will interact with and be
balanced against preexisting common law is where its fundamental tension with
conservation easements lies.
While all three of these values are upheld in both American law and culture, the
law cannot possibly promote all of them maximally and simultaneously in every
circumstance or jurisdiction, and it certainly cannot do so with total uniformity, as is
the case with competing public policy in other areas of the law.' 2 Because not all
9' Id. at 656-57.
96 
See Joseph L. Sax, Reflections on Western Water Law, 34 ECoLOGY L.Q. 299, 302 (2007). Much of this
environmental consciousness has been injected into the national, legal mainstream by federal legislation. See I LAW
OF ENVTL PROT. § 10:53 (ENVIL LAW INST. 2018) (Congress instituted these procedures, however, as part of a
broad national policy to encourage a 'productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment;
"to ... prevent or eliminate damage to the environment....'(quoting the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2018))); see also Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 4.
"7 Though, to be fair, it can be safely assumed that the grantee of a conservation easement does so
voluntarily and, especially in the case of private land trusts, may even have a pecuniary interest in its
investment. Stretch this principle to how a political unit might be prohibited from certain land uses,
however, as in the case of a public grantee, and you may see a limitation of sovereignty, though also
voluntary at the time the land is transferred.
9 8 
Canaparo, supra note 16, at 237 ("In sum, perpetual conservation easements resist attempts at modification
or termination. As a result, they guarantee perpetual nonuse even when perpetual nonuse is inefficient").
99 Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation Easements in the UnitedStates:
A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, I J.L. PROp. & SOCY 107,137 (2015).
'O See Glicksman, supra note 4, at 448; see generally Wilkinson, supra note 4.
"o' See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2018).
102 See, e.g., Alan Frank Pryor, Balancing the Scales: Reforming Georgia's Common Law in
Evaluating Restrictive Covenants Ancillary to Employment Contracts, 46 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2012)
(discussing Georgia's legislative attempts to balance the competing interests of businesses and employees
in the context of employment law) ("The Restrictive Covenant Act marks a turning point in Georgia
employment law. The Act is designed to attract businesses to Georgia, boost employment, raise wages,
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values in property law can be maximally and simultaneously supported, the law acts
as a mechanism by which society chooses which values it will promote and to what
extent it will promote each value in relation to one another, as well as what general
circumstances it will consider in reaching the decision.10 3 It is one significant role,
therefore, of the courts through common law and legislatures through regulatory
systems to ensure that such values are balanced in a way that is tailored to maximize
the social benefits of property creation, use, and transfer, whatever the final hierarchy
of values might be for a given group of people at a given time."° Conservation
easements present the issues in peculiar and difficult ways. This is so because the
country is currently seeking an effective implementation of some sort of coordinated
environmental response to meet global climate change and more localized ecological
problems.'05 Conservation easements have come to be regarded, by at least one
scholar, as a significant contributor to that response.'06 Of course, despite the
and increase the standard of living. The Act significantly shifts public policy by adding pro-firm policies
to balance its predominantly pro-employee common law. Further, a careful study of these provisions
shows that Georgia will not unduly harm employees' interests. The reasonableness test codified in the Act
is substantially similar to the common law, and the pro-employee policies espoused in the common law
remain strong considerations for courts."); see also Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms
and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 863, 864 (2001) (discussing both the utilitarian
and non-utilitarian social values and norms under common-law balancing tests as exercised by juries in
the context of negligence actions, arguing that previous conceptions of jury deliberation are not as
utility-heavy as once thought) ("Informal social norms play a crucial, albeit largely unheralded, role in
negligence law. The reasonable person standard is an empty vessel that jurors fill with community norms.
Jurors do this rather than performing cost-benefit analysis.").
1"3 Cf Joseph L. Sax, Reflections on Western Water Law, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 299, 302 (2007)
(discussing doctrinal reevaluation in water law in light of changing environmental circumstances)
("[W]ater law is turning out to be a new central battlefield for the definition of property rights. This is
perhaps the preeminent area in which you see the law responding through doctrinal reinterpretation to
changes in the social agenda."). Environmental change and its effect on the law provides a rich source of
conversation on this topic. The change in American water law acts as a clear example in which real-world
circumstances change, which change human needs, which results in a shift of human values, which finally
requires the law to adapt to serve those values. Fortunately, Americans live in a legal and representative
system that is built to be receptive to these changes, capable of adapting over time to meet changing human
needs in light of enduring principles. Such is the genius of the common law system.
1' This balancing is fundamental to many ongoing and lively discussions in intellectual property law,
where ethical, economic, and incentivization considerations guide the formulation of both statutory and
common-law intellectual property regimes. Seeking to balance the numerous factors for the sake of sound
social policy of property ownership frequently informs the considerations of conscientious legislatures
and courts. The inheritance of the economic and social considerations in the common law's treatment of
real property can be seen in similar policy discussions pertaining to intellectual property. See Michael A.
de Gennaro, The "Public Trust" Servitude: Creating a Policy-Based Paradigm for Copyright Dispute
Resolution and Enforcement, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131, 1141-42 (2005) (discussing the policy
balancing in the context of real-property servitudes as a mechanism for promoting economic and social
efficiency, while carefully emphasizing important economic distinctions between real property and
intellectual property) ("This is not to suggest that intellectual property is interchangeable with
common-law property. The standard argument is that intellectual property rights should be more limited
than common-law property rights, due to the uniquely nondepletable nature of the former." (footnote
omitted)). The point of this and the preceding footnote is to show how courts and legislatures must balance
competing social values by virtue of the impossibility of promoting all social values maximally and
simultaneously.
0' See Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 321-22.
'06 See id. at 322-24.
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approaching plateau of the world's population and reorientation of our relationship
with the environment1 °7, the problem remains that human development is still
necessary and demand for land development remains steady, if not on the rise.10 8
In America, a donor has exceptionally broad freedom to place conditions and
restrictions on a donee-beneficiaries' subsequent use and disposition of transferred
property."° The donor is afforded this authority over his property by the law, even
where the donee, if she had her way, would otherwise desire to use the property
transferred to her in a way contrary to the donor's intent.11° In other words, this
conflict manifests in the fact that interested persons in the distant future may be
bound by the intent of donors who, by effecting an irrevocable grant in probate or
trust, have no actual remaining interest in their transferred property.' Here, the
freedom of the donor and the alienability of property are both valued as a matter of
public policy in American law, but they cannot be simultaneously and maximally
promoted."2 The promotion of those values may be further limited in circumstances
that require consideration of relevant social values other than the desires of the
donors and donees, such as society's interest in the efficient or environmentally
107 See Anthony Cilluffo & Neil G. Ruiz, World's Population is Projected to Nearly Stop Growing
by the End of the Century, PEW RES. CTR. (June 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/06/17/worlds-population-is-projected-to-nearly-stop-growing-by-the-end-of-the-century/
[https://perma.cc/M6AH-EMMW].
108 See Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 321 ("Development of land, unlike consumption of renewable
resources, is generally irreversible. As the world population continues to expand, areas that retain their
natural condition are increasingly scarce. These remaining areas are subject to mounting pressure for
development."); see also Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2011, at 199, 218 (discussing conservation easements as a way of addressing
global climate change, but also as a method that presents its own complex issues in a world of changing
needs and circumstances).
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) ("Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.
... [T]he controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor's
intention; and [I that the donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.").
110 See id.
111 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Cenmy, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1189 (1985) ("Individual freedom to dispose ofconsolidated bundles of rights cannot simultaneously be
allowed and fully maintained. If the donor of a property interest tries to restrict the donee's freedom to dispose of
that interest, the legal system, in deciding whether to enforce or void that restriction, must resolve whose freedom it
will protect, that of the donor or that of the donee."). While the rigor mortis of"dead hand" control is often cited as
a primary justification for several common law property doctrines, the testator's subjective happiness and welfare
form an important, unspoken basis for fulfilling the testator's intent even after death. See J.D. Trout & Shahid A.
Buttar, Resurrecting "Death Taxes ": Inheritance, Redistribution, and the Science ofHappiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765,
789-90 (2000) (arguing that a materialist view of property ownership and transfer may place less emphasis on the
intent of a deceased loved one in life, but might still appreciate that "what will happen after one is dead is relevant to
one's level of welfare" in life because, "[flor example, one might be concerned that, without an inheritance, one's
offspring would be left vulnerable, and this worry about the future of one's offspring may erode one's happiness" in
life). It is arguably an indispensable, even if not routinely mentioned, justification for the American emphasis on
donative control by the donor's intent The possible policy concerns over which courts and legislatures are tasked
with exercising wise consideration could be innumerable and complex. This complexity further compounds the
difficulty of striking the best possible balance under varying and changing interests and circumstances affecting
human activity touched by the law.
112 See Alexander, supra note 11, at 1189.
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conscious use of property.113 But generally, as a matter of American legal tradition
and public policy, the intention of the donor carries such strong value that it will
overshadow and defeat even legitimate donee and non-donee interests alike, absent
a strong countervailing legal or policy justification."4
This is one such reason that the common law has evolved to balance the freedom
of donors against the freedom of future beneficiaries in relation to property use.
15
Neither is given unlimited freedom, and the law may, depending on the
circumstances, work to limit the expression of one value in order to preserve or
adequately promote another based on predetermined but changing priorities of
competing public policy. Thus, several legal policies have emerged that seek to strike
a balance of values so that property can be put to the most just and efficient uses,
even where such uses may not fully comport with the desire of the donor or strike
absolute harmony with other policy values."6 The common law has evolved to
address not only the most capricious restrictions,"7 but also those contained in
well-intentioned conveyances, where there is an apparently benevolent motivation
behind a transfer." 18 What might be considered as one such benevolent conveyance
"' See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications,
82 FORDnAM L. REV. 1125, 1138-39 (2013) ("In each of these situations, there is, ostensibly, a
countervailing policy for not effectuating the donor's ex ante wishes. Similarly, the UPC qualifies the
freedom of testation in several situations, including the elective share for surviving spouses, rule against
perpetuities, and rights of creditors." (footnotes omitted)). Notice here how American legal policy gives
strong consideration to parties who may not even be donors or intended donees with respect to the donative
instrument but are nonetheless interested parties by virtue of their being directly, and often indirectly,
affected by the transfer. Considerations for both direct and indirect effects, even for parties not privy to
the transfer of property interest, can also be seen in the context of conservation easements, and it will
become clear why conservation easements may be vulnerable to challenge as changing circumstances and
weak document drafting allow the class of interested parties to broaden, especially with the mandate of
perpetuity on easements essentially held in gross.
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) ("American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that the donor attempts to
make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law. The
term 'rule of law' is used in a broad sense to include rules and principles derived from the U.S.
Constitution, a state constitution, or public policy... [and] rules and principles of the common law and
of equity...." (emphasis added)). Note: "overriding," as used in Comment c of Section 10.1, implies a
balancing and comparison of legal authority and social policy when the intent of the donor is brought into
question before a court.
.. 5 See Alexander, supra note 111, at 1189 ("Although post-realist American property lawyers
acknowledge this conflict, at least nominally, it did not emerge into legal consciousness in so starkly
visible a form until the end of the nineteenth century." (footnote omitted)).
11
6 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) ("Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in certain instances
are those relating to spousal rights; creditors' rights; unreasonable restraints on alienation or marriage;
provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions;
provisions encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities and accumulations.
The foregoing list is illustrative, not exhaustive.").
"' See, e.g., Cape May Harbor Vill. & Yacht Club Ass'n v. Sbraga, 22 A.3d 158, 167-68 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011) (stating that restraints that are placed on land out of caprice or by a donor with no
interest in the land are factors tending to show unreasonableness (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 reporter's note (AM. LAW INST. 2000))).
" 8 See, e.g., 56 N.Y. JUR. 2D Estates, Powers, andRestraints on Alienation § 175 (2019) ("Where landis held,
whether or not in trust, for benevolent, charitable, educational, public, or religious purposes... [such as] by an
agreement o convey, reconvey, or surender the land or the estate so held upon a contingency relating to its use, an
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is a restrictive transfer of land made for environmental purposes in the form of a
conservation easement.119
Both our law and American culture recognize the value of allowing people to
control the way their property is distributed and expended, both in life and upon
death. Made to be complementary to this freedom, both state and federal
governments may create rules and incentives to ensure that property can be put to
better social use, including environmentally conscious land use. A now significant
and somewhat controversial way of incentivizing such use is offering tax benefits to
donors of property for conservational purposes, with the receipt of a federal
deduction contingent on the transfer being made in perpetuity.120 In the context of
conservation easements and environmental efforts generally, there arises a clear
tension between promoting essential environmental values and alternative uses for
encumbered land, land which might be put to a different, perhaps more efficient
use.
121
C. The Rule Against Perpetuities
Perhaps one of the more famous doctrines preventing perpetual property interests
is the Rule Against Perpetuities ("RAP"). This is one such doctrine that American
law has inherited, in one form or another, from England, 122 where judges, as
landowners themselves, were tasked with forming a rule satisfying the public's
desire for an active land market and the landowner's desire to keep land within the
family.123 As one legal historian put it:
The world in which the [R]ule evolved was that of the landed aristocracy
and gentry, and [the Rule's] function was to impose limits which seemed
reasonable in that world to the degree to which the head of the family, the
patriarch for the time being, could make binding dispositions of the family
estates which controlled their destination long into the future.
124
action may be brought in the [New York] supreme court to obtain relief from such restriction." (first citing Gale v.
Bath Cent Sch. Dist., 829 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); and then Long v. Pompey Hill Volunteer Fire
Dep't, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1989))).
119 See BREWER, supra note 39, at 17.
120 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (h)(1), (h)(5)(A) (2018).
12 See Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 321 ("Development of land, unlike consumption of renewable
resources, is generally irreversible. As the world population continues to expand, areas that retain their
natural condition are increasingly scarce. These remaining areas are subject to mounting pressure for
development."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998) ("The traditional constraints on servitude creation and the traditional constructional preference in
favor of free use of land grew out of concern that servitudes pose substantial risks to the value and
alienability of land, to competition, and to other social values. Although widespread use of servitudes has
established their great value in land development and conservation, they also may create social harm.").
122 John G. Shively, The Death of the Life in Being-The Required Federal Response to State
Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 371 (2000) ("The Rule is a product of
English law that has been part of American common law since the birth of the Republic.").123 
A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 208-09 (2d ed. 1986).
124 
A. W. BMAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES tN THE COMMON LAW 76 (1995). Note the echoes of this sentiment
in today's discussion on conservation easements, with hints of class inequity at the expense of public benefit
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The bane of many first-year law students for its unintuitive, common articulation,
and still codified in only a few state statutes,2 ' the RAP states: "No interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."'2 6 The long history of this rule in English and
American law has seen varying evolution and adherence over the course of its history
and has since been tailored by certain exceptions and mitigating doctrines under
changing needs and circumstances.27 It should be noted briefly at this point that
conservation easements do not actually violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, as they
do fit, at least officially, into the exception for donative transfers of property for
charitable purposes.'28 The RAP, like the other rules to follow, is brought up to
discuss its underlying rationale and to argue that the exception to the RAP that was
made for conservation easements does not square with the way that the easements
will likely function in application.
The underlying public policy against dead-hand control animates the RAP in
many states today, and, as it did in England, it survives in American property law as
an expression of apprehension towards the idea that a transferor should have an
unlimited right to hold the ownership and benefit of the property in a sort of limbo
of non-ownership.'29 The uncertainty of future beneficiaries and their needs, along
with the often-tenuous familial and personal connections between the transferor and
unascertained beneficiaries can lead to the unproductive use of property and,
arguably, could cause the property to fall into the hands of beneficiaries who lack
the interest or expertise to make efficient use of the property, regardless of how
"efficiency" is measured.3 ° Some of the public interests concerned under the RAP
are the economic benefits of freely transferrable property, especially in regard to
land.3 ' But at least one of the RAP's primary purposes was to keep property out
from under the thumb of long-deceased persons who could neither experience
concern for or foresee future needs of unascertainable and often non-existent future
beneficiaries.'32
125 HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 214 intro, summary (2019)
("The large majority of states, however, have either abolished the rule, thus permitting perpetual trusts, or
modified it, for example, by adopting a wait-and-see rule, or by giving the courts a cy pres power to reform
the offending language, or by imposing an absolute limit on the number ofyears by which time an interest
must vest, or by excepting trusts where the trustee has the power of sale." (footnotes omitted)).1 2 6 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942).
127 See HELENE S. SHAPOEr AL., BoGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 213 description of the rule (2019).
128 RESTATEMENT (THMIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATvE TRANSFERS § 27.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
129 Id. § 27.1 cmt. a ('The principal rule of public policy for curtailing excessive dead-hand control
is the Rule Against Perpetuities .... ).
130 See id. cmt. b (explaining the benefits to the generations-based perpetuity period in comparison to
the requirement that the measuring lives be "in being" because the latter "produces a perpetuity period
that is not tailored to the individual trust and family circumstances").
13 Id. ch. 27, intro, note.
132 See LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 122-24 (1955) (discussing the
tendency for charitable purposes of trusts to lose utility over time due to changes in circumstances).
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The aforementioned exception to the RAP made first for charitable donations
generally,33 and now for conservation easements specifically,134 however, is an
important part of the criticism of perpetual restriction. Unlike other private transfers,
conservation easements do not require ascertainable beneficiaries and are essentially
held in gross for the benefit of an amorphously defined group of people, such as a
state, municipality, or community unit. 135 Conservation easements have been
exempted from the RAP notwithstanding the inherent tension between the perpetual
easements and the policy underlying the Rule. But why was this exception adopted
by the various Restatements and other reputable authorities? It may be popularly
assumed by legal authorities that perpetuity is part of what makes conservation
easements effective, but this conclusion is not obviously true. More probably, the
exception was made as a matter of public policy, manifested in the tax code and
modem property treatise conclusions that qualifying transfers of real property
interests justify existence in perpetuity.36 The ultimate justification for mandated
perpetuity probably lies somewhere in a legislative compromise, one which allowed
the investment of foregone tax revenue in exchange for exclusively permanent grants
of land.
D. The Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation
There is yet another rule with similar policy underpinnings: The Rule Against
Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation ("RAURA"). This rule more generally
forbids transferors of property from, as the name suggests, unreasonably restricting
the ways that current or future interested parties may use, acquire, or dispose of
property.'37 While they share overlapping policy bases,38 one distinction between
the RAP and the RAURA is that the RAP forbids transferors of property from
creating interests with indeterminate future dates of vestment that are considered too
far removed from a certain group of eligible takers.'39 By contrast, the RAURA
forbids a property owner from creating provisions that unreasonably restrain a
133 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 396 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (predating the inclusion of the
conservation easement exception that exists in modem Restatements).
134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2000).
133 The Uniform Trust Code, for instance, permits charitable trusts, such as conservation easements,
to have non-specific, i.e. unascertainable, beneficiaries. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 402(a)(3)(A), (c)
(UNTF. LAW COMM'N 2000). This allowance for specifically unascertainable beneficiaries in the context
of charity is an example of the law accepting the potential costs associated with such arrangements as
justifiable in light of the social benefits of charitable contributions.
136 But see Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REV. 433, 457 (1984) ("[Tjhe more
important goal of liniting dead hand control may outweigh the value of freedom of contract in the context
of private conservation servitudes.").
137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
138 Id. § 3.1 reporter's note (stating "the similarity in objective between the rule against direct
restraints on alienation and the relatively modem rule against perpetuities" and noting that "[b]oth rules
come from the struggle of the English courts to preserve property free from inconvenient interference with
the alienation of property interests").
139 See GRAY, supra note 126, at § 201.
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grantee's right to alienate property otherwise lawfully transferred to him. 14° For this
reason, the RAURA is especially relevant in the conservation easement context
because they have the potential to offend this rule's clear underlying public policy
notwithstanding the statutory exception also made under the RAURA for
conservation easements.
As discussed above, private property ownership and transfer have long enjoyed
significant policy support in America because property owners have a right, some
would argue a natural right,' to dispose of their belongings as they see fit.' 42 While
American property owners possess peculiarly strong rights to dispose of property
compared to other countries, even here there are limits based on countervailing social
and economic policies.'43 Fundamentally, a restriction on the right to property must
not offend other fundamental rights of the transferee or intended beneficiary or be
unreasonable under the circumstances.'" This is the essence of the RAURA. Put
another way, the restriction must not offend public policy, 4 ' and if it is a serious
restraint, it must also be amply justified under the circumstances.'" The premium
that American law places on individual autonomy over one's property still acts as a
strong default consideration in favor of permitting some restrictions. ' But
American law upholds other values as well, and the RAURA is one way in which it
does so.
Springing from concerns toward lost public benefits or, even worse, affrmatively
imposed social costs, the RAURA prevents donors and transferors from rendering
property excessively inalienable. As a form of public policy, the RAURA is based in
"the desirability of keeping property responsive to the current exigencies of its
current beneficial owner and upon the desirability of avoiding the retardation of the
natural development of a community by removing property from the ordinary
channels of trade and commerce."'8 Of course, removing property from such
channels by a legal mechanism like a conservation easement can very well be
'0RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
'4' See Wu, supra note 88, at 20 ("As St. Thomas has said, 'All law proceeds from the reason and
will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human law from
the will of man, regulated by reason.' In other words, 'in order that the volition of what is commanded
may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason."' (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Summa Theologica la, Iae, Q. 90, a. 1, ad 3., Q. 97, a. 3, in corp.)).
142 But important to note for our purposes, the recipient, the party assumed to benefit from the transfer,
possesses robust fights as well, subject to reasonable limitations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2)-(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
143 See supra Section Il.B.
'44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
14' For example, "[e]ven Kentucky, which allows 'reasonable' forfeiture restraints and often construes
what are apparently disabling restraints to be forfeiture restraints, refuses to do so with respect o restraints
on involuntary transfer, and holds such restraints void." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 4.1 reporter's note (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (citing Smith v. Smith, 73 S.W. 1028 (Ky. 1903)).
146 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 405 cnt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1944) ("All restraints on alienation run
counter to the policy of freedom of alienation so that to be upheld they must in some way be justified.').
'47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("A servitude
created as provided in Chapter 2 is valid unless ... " (emphasis added)).
148 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 88 (2019) (emphasis added) (first
citing Venture Stores, Inc. v. Pacific Beach Co., 980 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); and then citing
Winecellar Farm, Inc. v. Hibbard, 27 A.3d 777 (N.H. 2011)).
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justified under some forms and circumstances, and perhaps in some cases, at least in
theory, in perpetuity. The RAUJRA, like the RAP, is another voice echoing from the
common law that cautions parties to conservation easements from drafting
conservation conveyances in ways that work against the needs of our future
environments and communities.
E. The Doctrine of Changed Circumstances
The doctrine of changed circumstances is yet another example of a common law
rule that could be applied to conservation easements and which should be applied if
necessary to promote the environmental purpose of an easement in light of changing
environmental circumstances.14 9 This doctrine confers authority on a court to alter a
servitude when a change in circumstances makes it impossible to accomplish the
purpose for which the servitude was created,5 ° or even to terminate an easement
when the purpose of the easement is finally accomplished.5' Under the Restatement
of Property: Servitudes, conservation and preservation easements are excluded from
operation of the doctrine."5 2 But why is this so? The reasons given in Comment
(a) of the Restatement are that (1) conservation easements have a clear perpetual
duration, (2) their creation is subsidized through tax deductions by the federal
government, and (3) a strong component of public interest leads to their exclusion
from this general rule.I 3 On the other hand, Comment (a) states that the fundamental
rationale behind the doctrine is that "potentially unlimited duration of servitudes
creates substantial risks that, absent mechanisms for non-consensual modification
and termination, obsolete servitudes will interfere with desirable uses of land.'' 15 4
It must then be asked, what constitutes a desirable use of land? Surely environmental
preservation can be a desirable use of land for the foreseeable future, thus justifying
the continuation and validity of the servitude, perhaps in perpetuity given the right
circumstances. But the rationale offered under a strong component of public interest
as a universal assumption for this doctrine's application removes conservation
easements entirely from alteration, seemingly regardless of whether the servitude can
continue to serve its environmental purpose in perpetuity.
It must be understood that social conditions, environments, and true ecosystems
are far from static. They change. Perpetuity clauses, if they are not illusory in light
149 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, amended 2007)
("A restriction burdening real property in perpetuity or for long periods can fail of its purposes because
of changed conditions affecting the property or its environs, because the holder of the conservation
easement may cease to exist, or for other reasons not anticipated at the time of its creation. A variety of
doctrines, including the doctrines of changed conditions and cypres, have been judicially developed and,
in many states, legislatively sanctioned as a basis for responding to these vagaries.").
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
151JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 10:8
(2019) ("An easement created to serve a particular purpose ends when the underlying purpose no longer
exists."). This statement about the termination of easements regards the cessation of purpose doctrine,
which is akin to or even a product of a broader doctrine of changed circumstances. See id.
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.10(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
153 Id. § 7.11 cmt. a.
154 Id. § 7.10 cmt. a (emphasis added).
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of future public needs,'55 instill maximal rigidity in an easement notwithstanding a
need for flexibility in the arrangement.156 It is not solely the length of time that is the
necessary condition for environmental progress that is important but a conscious,
careful evaluation of how circumstances change and the conditions under which
environmental objectives can and will be met.'57 Aside from temporal rigidity of a
perpetual term, conservation easements are often (or at least permitted and
incentivizes to be) created without a conscious effort to craft the instrument to be
adaptable to changed circumstances, and so such terms are more likely to be held
unreasonable as a result.158
A pattern should start to emerge as the logic of the common law runs across these
several doctrines. Our law has decided that conservation easements are so
exceptional in their purposes these doctrines will be expressly inapplicable to them.
The reason this exception is made is at least partly a matter of definition. Lawmakers
and legal institutes have seemingly decided a priori that the public interest in
conservation easements is so great that their perpetuity must be upheld even though
perpetuity would not otherwise be upheld under the common law. The further
implication, implied by the statutory tax requirements themselves, is that this
exceptional public interest is best served by restriction in perpetuity. But that cannot
be uniformly true if it is understood that environmental and economic needs change
significantly and sometimes rapidly over time in a very wide variety of ways peculiar
to the corresponding variety of ecosystems and diverse public needs. Meanwhile, the
significant benefits to the donor takes place only once, when that individual gets a
tax deduction for their donation.
159
The common law exceptions for conservation easements are wishful and
idealistic and, arguably, improper because conservation easements are not usually
'5- See Bray, supra note 11, at 138-40 (speaking of critics, like myself, as pointing out the illusory
promise of perpetuity) ("Indeed, it is precisely their point: '[t]he permanence of conservation easements
is a false goal, because it's simply not possible-in a physical sense, in a legal sense, in a sociological
sense-that oday's easements are going to endure."' (quoting JEFF PIDOT, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND
POLICY, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM
22 (2005), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/reinventing-conservation-easements-
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7MH-UQGU])).
156 Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 151 (2011) ("Conservation biologists and
environmental scientists advise addressing such problems through holistic programs that incorporate
principles of adaptive management. Current conservation easement use rarely involves holistic planning
or adaptive management." (footnote omitted)).
'7Owley, supra note 108, at 225-27.
's Id. at 199.
159 Apprehension towards possible one-sided benefits of the deduction is a major part of the
suggestions for conservation easement policy reform. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Incentives for
Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall
2011, at 29, 32, 48 (recommending the replacement of the current tax deduction with capped tax credits
and further oversight by the Bureau of Land Management); Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation
Easements: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, NAT'L CTR. PUB. POL'Y RES. (May 1, 2008),
https://nationaicenter.org/ncppr/2008/05/01/conservation-easements-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-by-
dana-joel-gattuso/ [https://perma.cc/6D99-XFHN] (recommending the "[p]hasing out [of] government
funding of land trusts," the elimination of estate taxes, and an amendment to the "tax code to allow for
fixed-term, rather than perpetual, conservation easements").
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fundamentally exceptional in their purpose or operation. The reality is that the
common law doctrine still exists and still operates in the background. The common
law can and will be applied to conservation easements in the future as individual
conservation easements begin to become either obsolete or an outright hindrance to
the needs of an ever-evolving environment and community.160 The rigidity with
which conservation easements are formed actually threatens both their efficacy and
legitimacy, and future generations may not be willing to tolerate them under evolving
needs and circumstances.
161
I. A NEW LOOK AT How CONSERVATION EASEMENTS ARE TREATED UNDER
COMMON LAW PROPERTY DOCTRINES AND PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES
TO PERPETUAL ENCUMBRANCE
It should be laboriously reiterated that perpetual restrictions on land are not
categorically without merit all the time. To take such a position would be to support
the very kind of evil this Note addresses: excessive generalization about the merits
of certain forms of conservation easements. Though it was not the topic of this Note,
a good comparison might be addressed. One type of charitable donation under
Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h) is a conservation easement on property- of
qualifying historic value. Like their environmentally-oriented counterparts, historic
conservation donations must also be made in perpetuity to qualify for a deduction. 
62
But perhaps that can be justified for different reasons than your average
environmental conservation easement.
A perpetual limitation used to protect a historical landmark in a growing
metropolitan area, for instance, can be appropriate because of the inherent value it
brings to the community.163 The social and cultural benefits that accrue to the people
who pass by a historical site justifies the forgone economic development as the site
meets higher community needs in the form of historical and cultural identity. 64 It is
crucial to emphasize that the value of these protected, encumbered plots do not come
from a city or state's arbitrary official designation of the property as having historical
significance but essentially from its continuing and independent real-world cultural
value. The restriction on use, alteration, development, and transferability in
perpetuity remains justified for historical easements, though alternative uses might
be imagined, such as to develop or change the property in a way that would be more
economically "efficient" in the form of a new job center or middle-income housing.
" See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of
Future Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 608-11 (2004) ("In its attempts to stop future
generations from developing land, the present generation is at a decisive disadvantage: it will not be
around to enforce its preferences.").
161 Id. at 608, 610-11,618.
162 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C), (h)(4)(A)(iv) (2018).
163 That's not to say especially in large metropolitan areas where there might be significant demand
for land, as such a restriction is not without the cost of alternative beneficial uses for the land.
164 
See David A. Lewis, Identifying and Avoiding Conflicts Between Historic Preservation and the
Development of Renewable Energy, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 274, 287 (2015) (listing the great benefits of
historical conservation).
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Despite the costs of preserving these sites, there is little to no disproportionate
conflict between common law principles and the preservation of property with
historical value. The value of historical conservation easements is largely derived
from their function and purpose of freezing a piece of property "in time."
The historical easement's cultural value directly relies on the relative stasis of the
use and historical form of the property. Because the value of such historic property
is clear, continuous, and directly attributable to its perpetuity, the eventual
opportunity costs of foregoing alternative uses is justified. This justification, which
lies in the connection between perpetuity and the public interest, is far less likely to
offend common law rules. Thus, as to conservation easements that protect historic
property, the tax deduction from the transfer of such property under perpetual
restriction is clearly justified, and the public investment in the maintenance of the
easement is assuredly sound.
On the other hand, in regard to environmental conservation easements, the value
of perpetual restraint must also be justified, particularly in terms of their assured
ecological and environmental purposes, and the terms of the servitude must be
designed to serve those ends. The goal of conservation easements, though they
similarly restrict alteration or development, should not necessarily be to do as little
with the land as possible, but, like a garden or museum, to actively prune and curate
the covered land. Conservation easements are not currently subject to the common
law doctrines limiting restrictions on property, but the policies underlying the
doctrines should be a lens through which we now shape policy around environmental
conservation easements and draft future easements. Because the common law smiles
on the efficient and socially beneficial use of property, it will protect and uphold the
creation of conservation easements that truly and directly serve the public interest.
To be clear, there are a significant number of conservation easements that have
been curated and made available to the public, including bike trails, accessible nature
preserves, and scenic attractions.165 But even without direct community access or
enjoyment, demonstrable environmental benefits can justify their existence.166 The
concern is the systemic incentivization of costly, inflexible restrictions, which are
disconnected from the specific environmental needs of a particular ecosystem and
community. 1
67
It seems that one of the primary sources of the predictable disconnect between
environmental benefits and perpetual restrictions is that much of the incentivization
coming from federal tax policy is so centralized and standardized that it may fail to
account for the peculiar environmental, economic, and community needs of a
particular region or parcel of land. Rather, as discussed, by requiring conservation
easements to be perpetual, our federal tax policy assumes from the start that perpetual
restrictions are more effective at furthering the environmental and community
benefits of a particular easement han more flexible arrangements.168 It must have
165 See Bray, supra note 11, at 161-66.
166 See Lewis, supra note 164, at 289-90.
167 See Cheever, supra note 62, at 433-35 (discussing "habitat particularity"); see also Nancy A.
McLaughlin & Jeff Pidot, Conservation Easement Enabling Statutes: Perspectives on Reform, 3 UTAH L.
REv. 811, 813 (2013).
168 See supra Part I.
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been further assumed by policymakers, perhaps unwittingly or in denial, that state
common law will forever cede to the seemingly arbitrary exception carved out for
conservation servitudes, and that the costs of forgone tax revenue and eventual
transaction costs of altering these easements would be justified.
There are many highly creative solutions offered as of late that cannot be given
due attention in this Note.169 But I offer one primary solution-to mandate more
consistent investigation into the costs and benefits of a perpetual duration,
particularly whether perpetuity would serve the environmental ends that the public
should come to expect of such heavy restriction. Otherwise, it is worth seriously
reevaluating the common law exceptions made for conservation easements so that
more effective and beneficial easements can be incentivized. Implementing such
steps will require more involvement by state agencies and local volunteers, and
possibly by private landowners especially, as well as more effective temporal
requirements for federal deduction eligibility. 7 ' Models of state and community
participation show that it is more important to consider what the public can do with
land under a conservation easement in light of changing circumstances than the
duration of the servitude is to be effective.7' Such a reemphasis would likely lead to
better outcomes and more resilient conservation easements. The combination of
more flexible temporal terms and more involved environmental management
strategies will lead to the greatest public benefit, among other factors of easement
formation and administration.
Ultimately, when a greater public benefit s possible, the underlying common law
policies will not be so affronted and the easement will more harmoniously exist in
the surrounding policy context. The goal is to strike a healthy balance between the
needs and desires of communities today and future communities, especially between
current environmental issues and eventual public endeavors. To strike this balance,
the bar for deduction qualification should be raised based on the quality of the
donation and the specific donative purpose must better justify the costs borne by the
public in maintaining the easement.
A. Reevaluation of the Common Law Exceptions Made for
Conservation Easements
The exception made for conservation easements, asdiscussed, is grounded in an
assumed public benefit.'7 2 But, in actuality, the perpetuity requirement makes an
unrealistic, blanket overestimation of the value of perpetual servitudes held in gross
and underestimates the costs and burdens to both present and future generations. No
public benefit, even one as noble as preserving natural health and beauty, is so high
as to be absolute or interminable. A call to reexamine the applicability of the
foregoing common law doctrines to conservation easements is in order so that future
generations do not bear the excessive costs of long-past donations of land
169 See, e.g., Cheever, supra note 62, at 445-50;, McLaughlin & Pidot, supra note 165, at 813-16, 821-25.
170 See infra Section III.B.
171 See infra Section III.C.
172 See supra Section II.E.
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purportedly made in the name of a good cause but more realistically for the
immediate tax benefit of relatively few people.
In this reevaluation, it is necessary to keep the specific policies underlying the
common law in mind so that environmental objectives can be reconciled with the
common law of property. For instance, the Rule Against Perpetuities is guided
primarily by the policy that dead-hand control of assets should be balanced against
the interests of those it currently and eventually affects, the donor and the alleged
beneficiaries of conservation easements in our case.173 Because private land trusts
are considered to hold land under a conservation easement in gross for the benefit of
the community generally,174 courts will soon have to balance the costs and benefits
of maintaining conservation easements as challenges to their continuation and terms
arise or as interested parties begin to find existing trust administration lacking. This
is especially true for perpetual land trusts where the transferor of trust property has
deceased and the "rigor mortis" of dead-hand control eventually sets in. 175
Recognizing the policy of balancing the interests of the dead with those living under
different circumstances is the first priority of the RAP.
176
Under the Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation, the common law
balances private and public interests for another policy reason: that "[t]o be
enforceable, restraints against the alienation of land must be reasonable in view of
the justifiable interests of the parties, and unreasonable restraints will be held
invalid." 177 Therefore, "the validity or invalidity of a restraint depends upon its
long-term effect on the improvement and marketability of the property."'178 In
general, the heavier the restraint, the greater its justification must be to support its
reasonableness and ultimate validity.179 One of the factors that shows a restraint to
be unreasonable is indefinite duration, i.e., perpetuity, even in light of other valid
reasons for a restraint such as environmental conservation.'
80
Conservational purposes, as discussed, are generally considered, and
understandably so, to be of such great public interest that the very category of
conservation easements justifies severe restraint (such as perpetual burdens on
land). 8 ' This exceptional treatment should not be taken for granted. As important as
conservation efforts are, many other noble purposes, such as property allocated in
trust for children's hospitals, biomedical research, and the assistance of indigent
citizens, are all subject to reasonable ways of terminating or altering the terms
"' See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
174 See NANCY A. MCLAUGHLIN, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACL STUDY




See supra note I11.
176 See supra Section II.C.
177 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 90 (2019) (citing Horse Pond Fish &
Game Club, Inc. v. Cormier, 581 A.2d 478 (1990)).
178 id.
17 9 Alfaro v. Cmty. Hous. Imp. Sys. & Planning Ass'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271, 290 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (quoting City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).
18 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 406 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
... See supra Section II.E.
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burdening alienability of property, land in particular. 18 2 We can agree that donations
for these purposes deserve higher protection in the form of higher thresholds for
finding unreasonableness, but not so unlimited and inflexible as to categorically
enforce restraints on alienability, marketability, and use in perpetuity, at least not
without regard to the varying conservational value of particular parcels. The
legitimacy and longevity of such restraints, perhaps counterintuitively, will rely on
their limitation and flexibility, not their rigid perpetuity. The strength of the
conservation easement as an institution depends, in part, on established connection
to environmental conservation efforts.
B. Ways to Reconcile Environmental Objectives with Common Law Principles
While Bolstering the Legitimacy of Conservation Easements
The turn of the century saw an upsurge of concern regarding climate change and
ecological conservation, with focus in large part on human activity and its effect on
ecological change."3 As a result, many specific efforts began in response, and with
some remarkable success.4 It is necessary in the course of both conservational and
rehabilitative environmental efforts to determine specific areas of need and to devote
resources efficiently towards pecific goals. Not generally characteristic of those
successful policy efforts is the implementation of arbitrary standards and timelines.
Aside from completely rethinking the relatively disinterested, hands-off
approach of requiring standard terms like blanket perpetuity, states and localities
should be more involved in (1) evaluating the statement of express, specific
objectives for a particular donation as the conservation easement is being considered
for creation and (2) pursuing investigations through cooperation between expert land
trusts, universities, and state environmental agencies to determine the legitimate
necessity of the easement and, in particular, an empirically supported duration for
the servitude. Most specifically, these two requirements should consider the time it
will take to accomplish the easement's pecific objectives. The current practice of
rewarding only perpetual restriction does not take adequate account of the
conservational value of a particular parcel of land. 85 What should be emphasized is
'8 2Cf UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
8 The publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 1962 is seen as a critical turning point in
American conservation and environmentalism in the mid-twentieth century. See Bray, supra note 11, at
127; see generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (3rd prtg. 1962). You see an increase in conservation
easement donations around this time. Bray, supra note 11, at 127-28.
184 One such example is in the reclamation of strip mines, many of which are found in eastern and
western Kentucky. In part mandated or incentivized by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA), but also initiated in partnership between state and non-profit actors, new measures
were introduced to return land mutilated by coal surface mining to a state habitable by wildlife. Not only
have these reclamation efforts been successful, they have actually created new habitats for vulnerable
non-native species and have allowed for the expansion of new, vibrant ecosystems. See generally Sarah
Lazarovic, How to Restore a Million Acres of Strip-Mined Land? Bring in the Elk, YES! (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/dirt/2019/04/13/land-recovery-elk-wildlife-habitat-appalachia/
[https://perma.cc/RN3K-CVB8] (discussing the massive 16-county initiative to introduce elk to the
eastern Kentucky region, among other similar efforts).
18' See Owley, supra note 156, at 151 ("Current conservation easement use rarely involves holistic
planning or adaptive management.").
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that the end to perpetual easements altogethr is not a reform that is called for, but
rather a shift to implement proper timelines for achieving an environmental objective
for a given parcel. This is not a demand that people establish deadlines for
completion of an environmental objective but a suggestion to use time frames, should
they be applicable, verified by a reviewing entity, preferably local, to determine and
encourage expedient progress towards a specified environmental goal. What is
expected from this reform would be a reconciliation of the common law and our
more common restrictions on land with the effect that conservation easements will,
in general, become more insulated from foreseeable challenges. Rather than giving
courts a reason to invalidate an easement for imposing an excessive and unreasonable
temporal restriction, 186 conservation easements should be more thoughtfully
connected to the purpose of their restrictive nature.
An express statement of how an environmental goal relates to a servitude's
temporal effect provides a clearer, more particular purpose for the donation, prevents
the public subsidization of relatively unimportant or non-beneficial parcels of land,
and solidifies concrete goals with a realistic timeline. Eventual critics of
environmental efforts, such as a developer who might eventually challenge the
necessity of a conservational servitude, gain an advantage when environmentalists
fail to articulate locally relevant, specific, and concrete objectives for the restriction.
Putting yourself in the position of a judge, consider which of the following options
sounds more reasonable and valuable:
(A) "The terms of this qualifying conservation easement are to have
perpetual effect, not subject to change as long as this restriction exists in
perpetuity. This land shall not be sold, alienated, or used for [V, W, X, Y,
Z purposes]." Assume some such prohibited purposes (V through Z),
while carrying environmental costs, have social and economic benefits.
Also assume that at the time the easement is challenged it serves little or
no remaining public interest based in part on its location near a growing
rural population and because of its relatively inconsequential ecological
value. Assume finally that under current circumstances not foreseen by
the land's initial grantor, the community would be more benefited by its
development or through the pursuit of some alternative management or
use.
or
(B) "This conservation easement shall be effective for a term of fifty (50)
years beginning at transfer, subject o the state or municipal government
body tasked with reviewing the management and environmental need of
the servitude. During that time, this land shall be held in trust, subject to
oversight by the pertinent government body to ensure that its
environmental purpose is being actively met. This servitude has been
granted subject to eventual review at the end of its term, though it is being
granted with the expectation [perhaps the assumption] that the reviewing
1
86 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("Through
legislation and decisions, use restrictions are now invalidated if they are arbitrary or unreasonable.").
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body will prolong/reinstate its effective date by at least another fifty (50)
years. Of particular but not sole import, this easement is granted for the
rehabilitation of [X, Y, and Z native species found on this specific donated
parcel], which is essential to the balance of [Region/State's] ecological
state, agricultural productivity, and recreational/tourismq value. (cites
several scientifically substantiated reasons). For this reason, in our
analysis of similar conservational efforts, we believe that this fifty-year
term is necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of these species and to
ensure the public benefit of this land. Upon reevaluation, which should
consider the sort of changes or development of the land that would be
compatible with the easement's purpose, renewal for a similar 50-year
term is permitted when the following are demonstrated: [A, B, and C
specific, scientifically substantiated reasons]." Assume that at the time of
review fifty years later, there may be some economic benefit to the land's
development or alternative use, but the progress made in those fifty years
of existence are of sufficient popular benefit that a reviewing body finds
both significant environmental progress and substantial public support for
the easement's continuation.
Example (A) is arguably what is currently encouraged, and it should be noted
how highly vulnerable it can be to an eventual challenge for the lack of a specific,
dynamic purpose. It is characterized by a disconnection between the specific
conservational goal and the duration of the servitude in its region.'87 Perhaps more
subtly, its inflexibility is more likely to impress those in the future with a sense of
imposition rather than of possibility and purpose. The arrangement could be made
stronger by connecting its perpetuity with a reason for that temporal effect.
Something as simple as natural beauty, the desire of the public to avoid blotchy
development at the foot of a pristine mountain range, for instance, could amply
justify an extremely long-term restriction.'88 As with a historic landmark, a particular
parcel of land might have significant enough scenic value alone to justify the
restriction. It need not confer some grand, far-reaching ecological benefit.
Example (B) is much less vulnerable than (A) because it clearly expresses how
it is a source of environmental and public benefit and connects that benefit to a
substantiated time frame to meet that end. It should ideally state the specific means
and expectations for the easement, which include more than just environmental
benefits, if possible. In addition, flexibility in terms of duration and particular terms
should be encouraged by interested government and community entities, rather than
be denied subsidization as it would be under today's tax and environmental policy.
The language and specificity of (B) allows those who would challenge the easement
to wait until the end of the term when review is due and provides such interested
parties an opportunity to cleanly and efficiently challenge the easement if happened
to fail to meet the easement's express purposes. In theory, these effects should also
act as an incentive for the easement holder to manage land in accordance with the
instrument's pro-environmental terms.
187 See Cheever, supra note 62, at 432-33 (discussing "habitat particularity").
"' Indeed, it is already a qualifying conservational purpose in the tax code. I.R.C.
§ 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(I) (2018).
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C. A Case of Community Involvement and its Connection to
Environmental Progress: A Kentucky Success Story
In Kentucky, Shaker Village of Pleasant Hill was an exciting project in which an
unproductive beef pastureland operation was turned around to halt the significant
population decline of a delicate native species, the Northern Bobwhite Quail.189 Over
the course of ten years,' I the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources
(KDFWR) and the Natural Resources and Conservation Service (NRCS), among
other environmental agencies, successfully restored the valuable and rare prairie
habitat, along with the natural grassland in which quail can reproduce and thrive, and
which there are now a sufficient number to allow hunting.'9 '
There was an initial comprehensive analysis of how the Northern Bobwhite Quail
might return to various regions of Kentucky."'9 The specific goals and means of quail
population rehabilitation would look very different in the flatter western portion of
the state, where the grasses quail need grow more readily than in other potential
Bobwhite habitats.'9 3 For instance, in the eastern portion of the state, where the
dense, hilly forestation of the Appalachian Mountains ordinarily provides scant
opportunity for resettlement of these prairie animals, an unlikely suspect, reclaimed
and abandoned coal mines, provided fortuitous opportunities for restoration and
conservation of quail populations.'94 Many individuals in eastern Kentucky now
report hearing quail calls'9 5- -calls they likely have not heard in decades, if ever.
As a result of this and many other successful cultural and environmental efforts,
"Shaker Village has become a research station for local, state and federal
conservation partners."196 The question is: If the conservational efforts of Shaker
Village, or even a reclaimed mine in eastern Kentucky, were subject to a
conservation easement hat was created with a fifty-year review period, would the
continuation of the conservation efforts be more or less vulnerable than if the
easement were granted in perpetuity? For the reasons above, in this case, it seems
clear that it would be less vulnerable, and environmental and community interests
would be renewed semi-centennially as long as the conservation efforts were
continued. This is because the temporal restriction has a meaningful, rational
connection to the purported purpose of such a restriction, justifying any alternative
89 See Land Conservation, SHAKER VILAGE, htlps//shakervillageky.org/land-conservaion/
[https'//pemacc/F4HJ-RPXP].
'90 The Preserve, SHAKER VILLAGE, httpsl/shakervillagekyorg/the-preserve/ [httpsl/pemacc2UHL-MWBA].
191 Land Conservation, supra note 189.
192 See generally JOHN J. MORGAN & BEN A. ROBINSON, KY. DEP'T FISH & WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
ROAD TO RECOVERY: THE BLUEPRINT FOR RESTORING THE NORTHERN BOBWHITE N KENTUCKY 5-7




195 Seth Lamar, Quail Comeback of Kentucky, GOLD STANDARD (Nov. 28, 2011, 3:21 PM),
https://www.fkgoldstandard.com/content/quail-comeback-kentucky [https://perma.cc/QUN4-RUDC].
For those curious to hear what a bobwhite mating call sounds like, it can be enjoyed at the following
link: https://fw.ky.gov/Hunt/mp3/Bobwhite.mp3.
196 Land Conservation, supra note 189.
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forgone benefit. Yet, the careful efforts and demonstrated success of such a
restriction can be said to be so remarkable that even a substantial temporal restriction
on the use of such property, say, in perpetuity, would be justified and enforced,
perhaps even as long as the success persisted under the restriction.
What Would likely happen if developers or adversely interested parties wished to
challenge certain restrictions on ownership or transfer of the land? Sufficient public
opposition to be sure,'97 but likely also a court that recognizes the legitimate,
protectable connection between concrete conservational goals, the role of the land
used for those goals, and its connection to the temporal requirements of meeting
those goals. Even if our hypothetical servitude were subject to renewal, its evident
popularity would be a force for renewal, and the public could be relied on to prevent
the kind of development that initially forced the public to intervene and begin
rehabilitation, particularly destructive industrial farming. 98 The public benefit to the
community, Bobwhite hunters, tourists, local ecosystems, and natural beauty were
shown to bear a legitimate connection to the project tirne-frame,' making it much
harder to challenge under common law doctrines, even if it were renewed or
ultimately held in perpetuity under the same relatively severe restriction.
20 0
Remember what suggestions were made for conditional qualification and
formation of conservation easements: (1) specific objectives associated with the
temporal aspect of the restriction and (2) thorough, scientifically substantiated means
of meeting those objectives within that concrete time-frame. The Road to Recovery
demonstrates precisely that successful approach. 201 It states the specific
problem-quail population decline, among other significant environmental
needs-and provides a scientifically substantiated ten-year timeline for the
implementation of a state-wide effort tailored to different regions. 202 The
result: absolute success,20 3 but no apparent thanks to any perpetual term of the grant.
In other words, the success was achieved independent of an unlimited time-frame.
A sophisticated plan was established, diligent and measured effort was taken during
that time in stages, and organizations well-suited to make active progress were
gathered to prosecute the effort. Progress was made in a decade, and the benefit of
that success was so strong that its permanent protection would be wholly justifiable.
It was not the authority to perpetually encumber land that would lead to success; it
was what was specifically done with the land in a projected timeframe that justified
any resulting social costs of the project.
The effort made in Kentucky to rehabilitate the Northern Bobwhite Quail
population is an excellent example of success that owes itself to careful,
particularized goals based in a scientific understanding of why that species
197 See Rissman, supra note 12 ("Several land trusts benefited from involving community members
and local government officials as 'watchful neighbors' who helped monitor land trust properties.").
198 See MORGAN & ROBINSON, supra note 192, at 2, 4.
199 See id. at 7, 30-31.
200 See generally James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 69
(2009), for an argument that land trusts are an effective vehicle for developing a sense of community.
201 MORGAN & ROBINSON, supra note 192, at 6-8, 30-31.
2 Id. at 4-6,17-19, 30-31.
203 See Land Conservation, supra note 189, for a summary of the various successes during the
collaborative conservation and habitat restoration effort.
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experienced such a marked decline in native numbers to the point that the quail had
all but disappeared entirely in other regions. Notably, the plan to help quail
populations focused on the vast variety and quality of resulting social benefits, set
specific timelines to monitor and promote the success of the plan, and specified the
regions of Kentucky that would most efficiently contribute to the restoration.204 Not
once was it emphasized that the success of this program required perpetual
restrictions, even though it may have been incidentally executed partially on lands
held under perpetual restriction.
The Kentucky case is a useful one to look to, not only because of the restoration
plan's great success but also, for our purposes, because the territory of Kentucky
contains many different regions and ecosystems with varying needs.2 0 5 The plan
inherently acknowledges this reality.2°6 What the restoration plan clearly accounts
for is the vastly different needs of a particular ecological entity, like the Northern
Bobwhite, as it relates to a particular geographical and ecological situation. For
instance, while the plan sees conservation grants and easements as a potentially
valuable, perhaps even necessary, element of the rehabilitation plan, it sought only
to focus conservation efforts on lands that would actually contribute to the Bobwhite
population's rehabilitation.207 Not all land in Kentucky has the same potential to
contribute to that end, as the former prairies in which the Northern Bobwhite thrived
in the past are not seen in every region of the Bluegrass State. For instance, it would
make no sense for Kentucky's Conservation Reserve Program to arrange state
subsidization of a perpetual restriction on a strip of land along the Ohio River in the
hilly, more urbanized terrain of Covington, Kentucky where the Northern Bobwhite
has not and is for now unlikely to exist due to denser forestation and concentrated
human populations."0 8 Perhaps there is another conceivable environmental objective
to connect that land to, but not for quail rehabilitation.
204 MORGAN & ROBINSON, supra note 192, at 7, 20-31.
205 For instance, the city of Berea, Kentucky sits at the foot of the Cumberland Plateau, at the outer
edge of the Eastern Kentucky Coal Field. Berea's mountainous appearance comes from its geographical
situation, against the backdrop of the Appalachian Mountains, with a maximum elevation of 1660+ feet
above sea level at Bear Mountain. Bear Mountain, Kentucky, PEAKBAGGER.COM,
https://www.peakbagger.com/peak.aspx?pid=7408 [https://perma.cc/V7RF-HDGX]. In contrast, less
than 40 miles north in Lexington, Kentucky, sitting within the inner-Bluegrass region, the world-famous,
horse-farm-dotted, rolling hills are scattered among more subdued geography, characterized by soil rich
in limestone and land reaching a maximum altitude of 1069 feet above sea level. Fayette County High
Point, Kentucky, PEAKBAGGER.COM, https://www.peakbagger.com/peak.aspx?pid-23346
[https://penna.cc/ZL5T-ZPYM].
206 MORGAN & ROBINSON, supra note 192, at 17 19.
20
7 Id. at 12.
208 Cf Bobwhite Quail Management, TEXAS PARKS & WILDUFE,
ht"/tpwd.texas.govandwaterland/habitas/highoplains/upland game/bobwhite.phtnl [https://pema.cc/5UA9-
GF77] (discussing the ideal quail habitat under heading "Habitat") ("[Quail] prefer habitats with a mixture of
grassland, cropland, brushy areas and woodland interspersed to provide abundant areas of "edge," which include the
margins of habitats where two or more cover types come together."). It is for this reason that such lands may not
even be eligible for a federal tax deduction due to a failure to apply to land constituting "a relatively natural habitat
of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem." I.R.C. § 170(hX4XAXii) (2018). In a regulation, the Department of
the Treasury elaborated on what is meant by "relatively natural habitat" in section 170(h). Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(d)(3) (2019).
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For the specific purpose of bringing back the Northern Bobwhite, such a
conservation grant would be meaningless, or worse, deleterious to the cause, as it
would syphon away scarce resources from an otherwise effective and targeted
environmental agenda. A perpetuity clause may have only exacerbated that problem.
Dubbing the grant a conservation easement and attempting to arbitrarily immunize
it from subsequent challenges under the common law cannot be forever effective
against such challenges when interested parties in the future might realize greater
public benefit in alternative land use. To protect such an easement because its terms
state its perpetual effect would merely delegitimize otherwise valuable
conservational efforts through the acceptance of conservation easements that rely on
circumstantially unnecessary and useless restrictions. Without an actual, legitimate,
and specific reason to burden the alienability and use of particular lands in a
demonstrably beneficial way, like a targeted environmental objective and purposeful
time frame, any future challenges are more likely to be successful.
CONCLUSION
Establishing an actual, specific nexus between a particular restriction on land use
and the purported environmental end can help to justify an otherwise severe
limitation on land use and alienation. Because blanket perpetuity requirements are
likely to create, rather than prevent, future opportunities for lateral attack on
conservation easements under the common law, interested parties should strongly
consider how they link temporal conditions, whether in perpetuity or in set terms,
with a proportionate environmental need. Our current tax policy neither encourages
this nor allows it, at least for landowners motivated by tax benefits, because
perpetuity is a requirement for the charitable deduction. Such proportionality will be
best evidenced by scientifically based investigations as a condition to and pursuant
to grant-instrument creation. The federal government in particular should reevaluate
the states' ability to severely restrict land use over extended periods of time. This is
especially true because this deduction-for-perpetuity arrangement acts as an indirect
public investment with a seriously uncertain long-term return for reasons just
discussed. Until such adjustments are made to the tax code and to national
environmental policy generally, community and government support for
conservation easements will diminish over time as existing conservation easements
with otherwise great potential are individually challenged and possibly defeated, all
because of the false and arbitrary assumption that conservation easements were so
special that they could be sustained in perpetuity. For the reasons discussed
previously, this Note is offered as a voice in support of reevaluating section 170(h)
deduction requirements and the perpetual restrictions mandated thereunder.
